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TORTS-BLASTING RESULTING IN INJURY TO PROPERTY.
An action for damages for injury to property by blasting raises a
number of questions on which the courts are in no way consistent.
(1) The injury may be the result of a direct trespass, where
rocks or other debris are cast upon the land or buildings thereon;'
(2) or it may be caused by vibration of the land or concussion of the
air.2 Where either or both of these situations arise and the remedy
at law is inadequate, equity should grant relief to the complainant
and protect him against irreparable injury by the nuisance which de-
stroys the safety and comfort of his home.2
In a case where blasting has cast debris upon the land of another,
the courts are fairly consistent in holding the party doing the blasting
liable, irrespective of the question of negligence.' The Kentucky courts
follow this rule,5 as do the federal courts.
The theory of direct trespass (the casting of debris upon land of
another), is the basis upon which the majority of the courts fix abso-
lute liability.7 This result is the same where the plaintiff's person, as
well as his property, has suffered injury. This theory of direct tres-
pass, however, has logically forced the courts to the ridiculous con-
clusion that where the harm has been caused by concussion, no re-
covery is permitted unless on the ground of negligence.
It has been shown, presumably, that in this particular type of case
(the casting of debris upon the land of another), the decision could
have been the same had it rested upon the ground of negligence. 1'
Yet the courts have not yet repudiated the common law doctrine, nor
manifested an inclination to do so.
'Hay v. Cahoes, 2 N. Y. 159 (1849).
2Booth v. Rome R. R. Co., 140 N. Y. 267, 35 N. E. 852 (1893).
3Hill v. Schneider, 13 N. Y. App. Div. 299, 43 N. Y. S. 1 (1897).
4 Hay v. Cahoes, note' 1, supra.
5 Adams v. Sengel, 177 Ky. 535, 197 S. W. 974 (1917); Langhorn v.
Turman, 141 Ky. 809, 133 S. W. 1008 (1911); Allegheny Coke Co. v.
Massey, 163 Ky. 792, 174 S. W. 499 (1915); Hiefer v. Central Kentucky
Traction Co., 145 Ky. 108, 140 S. W. 54 (1911); Eureka Elkhorn. Coal
Co. v. Lawson, 194 Ky. 14, 241 S. W. 335 (1922); Williams v. CodelN
Const. Co., 253 Ky. 166, 69 S. W. (2d) 20 (1934).
'Asheville Const. Co. v. Southern Railway Co., 19 Fed. (2d) 32
(1927) ;Carey Bros. v. Morrison (C. C. A. 8th), 129 Fed. 177 (1904).
' Asheville Const. Co. v. Southern Railway Co., note 6, supra; State
Corp. v. Shell, 216 Ky. 57, 287 S. W. 210 (1926); Langhorn v. Turman,
Adams v. Sengel, Allegheny Coke Co. v. Massey, Hiefer v. Central Ky.
Traction Co., Eureka Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Lawson, Williams v. CodeUl
Const. Co., note 5, supra.
a Louisville & Nashville Railway Co. v. Smith's Administrator, 203
Ky. 513, 216 S. W. 2 (1923).
9Booth v. Rome Railroad Co., note 2, supra.
10 Selected Essays on Law of Torts, Article by Jeremiah Smith, 644.
STUDENT NOTES
Where substantial injury Is done to one's land or buildings by
vibrations or concussion caused by blasting, "the majority rule is that
there can be no recovery unless negligence is alleged and provied.
The negligence necessary to maintain an action for Injuries due to
concussion may be of two descriptions. (1) In certain localities, such
as a thickly populated district, the negligence may consist in attempt-
ing to blast at all.? (2) It mgy consist in negligently conducting
blasting operations undertaken at a proper time and place, such as
blasting after defendant's attention has been called to the injury
being caused bS, blasting, or by using larger quantities than were rea-
sonably necessary.23
In the case of Fitzsimmons Co. v. Brown," the court said:
"If, wfhen the use is lawful, even though naturally dangerous
in probable consequences, no liability can be predicated save upon
a negligent manner of use, then this cause was submitted to the
jury upon an erroneous theory of law. If, however, the contractor
who makes use of a dangerous explosive in the ground near the
property of another, and when a natural and probable, although
not inevitable, result of such use is injury to such property, is
liable for the resulting injury irrespective of the degree of care
exercised in the handling or exploding of the substance, then the
case was properly submitted and the recovery sustained. We do
not regard the evidence as insufficient to sustain the recovery
under the allegations of the narr. It is true that it is alleged in
each count that the defendant negligently used the explosive. But
the charge is not confined to the manner in handling the explosive,
but goes to the negligence of any use of it, however careful the
particular method of handling, which naturally caused an injury
to another. While there is no evidence to establish any negligence
in the specific manner in which the explosive was handled, yet the
evidence does establish that negligence which the law imputes to
an act by which the property of another will naturally and prob-
ably be caused a consequential injury."
Thompson summarizes the situation thusly:
"It is obvious, upon a moment's reflection that the work of the
blasting of rocks being absolutely necessary in excavating through
beds of rock in mining, in digging wells, in excavating foundations
for buildings, in improving roads and streets, in digging canals
and in building railways, cannot under all circumstances be re-
garded as a nuisance per se and condemned as being negligent
as a matter of law. On the other hand, it was regarded and the
decisions so regard it, as a work which one proprietor may law-
fully do upon his own land, provided he takes due care to avoid
injuring persons and property in the vicinity, and is subject to his
n Booth v. Rome Railroaa Co., note 2, supra; Gibson v. Womack,
218 Ky. 626, 291 S. W. 1021 (1927); Williams v. Codell Const. Co.,
Hiefer v. Central Ky. Traction Co., note 5, supra; State Corp. v. Shell,
note 7, supra; Jefferson v. Pohlmon, 243 Ky. 556, 42 S. W. (2d) 344
(1932).
"Colton v. Onderlonlc, 69 Cal. 155, 105 Pac. 395 (1931); ,xner v.
Therman Power Co., 54 Fed. (2d) 510 (1931).
23Brooks-CaZlowaV Co. v. Carroll, 235 Ky. 41, 29 S. W. (2d) 292
(1930).
U"94 Ill. App. 533 (1900), AfE'd. 199 Il. 390, 65 N. E. 249 (1902)
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obligation to pay damages for any injury which he does In case hir.
blasting involves a direct invasion of the premises of an adjacent
proprietor."''
In the case of Lowden v. City of Cincinnati," the court said:
"Is not a concussion of the air and jarring, breaking, and
cracking of the ground with such forde as to wreck the building:
thereon, as much an invasion of the rights of the owner, as the-
hurling of a missile thereon?"
Although some courts distinguish between direct and consequentiaL
injury,17 other courts have held differently.28 The doctrine of the Colton
case may be stated broadly, that whenever one uses a violent and
dangerpus explosive to blast rock even upon his own premises, if such
premises are contiguous to other property, such use is sufficient to,
impose a liability for injury, direct or consequential, irrespective of
the degree of skill or care exercised in using the explosive.
The preferable rule, it seems, is that the distinction between direct.
and consequential injury should be disregarded and that the courts
should hold the defendant liable for injuries, whether direct or con-
sequential, if they are the probable and natural consequences of the.
use'of a dangerous agency.
Other courts apply what is, in fact, the doctrine of Rylands .v.
Fletcher," by stretching the trespass doctrine, since they feel there is
no distinction between injury caused by flying debris and injury caused
by concussions. Still others have allowed recovery on the theory of a.
nuisance." A few courts have sought to reach the same result by the
device of res ipsa 7oquitur. But this, if correctly applied, merely re--
quires the defendant, at most, by weight of evidence to show that he
was not careless."
A situation may arise, in which the quiet and peaceful enjoyment
of a person's premises is greatly endangered, and yet the aggrieved
party may not have an adequate remedy at law. In this case the equity
court should grant relief by way of an injunction.2' Although a legiti-
mate business, properly conducted, may not be a nuisance per se, if real
damage or great inconvenience is occasioned by the carrying on of a
noisy trade, or by otherwise causing excessive noise or vibration, an
injunction may be obtained to prevent its continuance."
2Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Negligence, Vol. 1,.
Sec. 765.
16 94 Ohio St. 144, 106 N. E. 970 (1914).
"Hay v. Cahoes, note 1, supra; Tremain v. Cables Co., 2 N. Y. 163
(1849).
i Colton v. Onderlonk, note 12, supra.
'-'L. A., 3 House of Lords 330 (1868).
"Kerbaugh v. Caldwell, 151 Fed. 194 (1907); Texas By. v. Nixon,.
21 S. W. (2d) 1098 (Tex. Civil App., 1929).
Bohlen, 68 U. of Pa. L. R. 307, at 315.
0Hamilton Corp. v. Julian, 130 Md. 597, 101 Atl. 558 (1917).
0 Hennessey v. Carmony, 50 N. J. Eq. 616, 25 Atl. 374 (1892); Em-
rick v. Marcueilli, 196 Ky. 495, 244 S. W. 865 (1922).
STuDENT Noms
The question in all cases is whether the annoyance produced is
such as to materially interfere with the ordinary comfort of human.
existence. It is not necessary that the annoyance and discomfort
should be so great as to actually drive the person complaining thereof
from his dwelling; but if the alleged injury be a plain interference
with ordinary comforts and enjoyments, there is a nuisance, no matter
how slight the damage, provided the inconvenience is actual and not
fanciful.2'
As a general rule, negligence is not involved in nuisance actions,
or proceedings and is not essential to a qause of action.z
Where a business is of itself a nuisance, one who has been Injured-
thereby may maintain an action for injury, though no negligence
exists, negligence not being an essential element In such .case.m But.
where a business is lawful and properly conducted, it is not a nuisance
per se. It may, however, be so negligently conducted as to practically-
become a nuisance, in which case negligence must be shown (in those
jurisdictions that require negligence to be shown) to entitle a plaintiff
to recover damages.- In some jurisdictions, even though a business is
lawful and operated with utmost care, an injunction will lie against.
blasting.2
The locality may constitute an important element in determining
whether or not an act is a nuisance. It may be a nuisance in one
locality and not in another.4
In the case of Hill v. Schnieder,3* the court held that a tenant of
a building was entitled to an injunction against blasting about to be-
done by a contractor in removing rock from adjoining premises where
it is shown that the walls of the building have already been shattered:
by blasts of the same character and force made at a greater distance.
and that the excavations can be readily made in a different manner,
though at an increased cost. In such a case, the tenant's remedy at.
law is inadequate.
Injunctions have been granted on the sole ground of preventing.
multiplicity of suits at law, because of a continuing or . recurring.
nuisance. However, the courts have shown the same lack of unanimity-
that is always common to this ground of jurisdiction. Whether it
arises out of trespass, nuisance, or other tort, consistent with the prin-.
ciple, the weight of authority holds that the mere existence of a con-
429 Cyc. 1189; Hennessey v. farmony, note 23, supra.
Gus Blass Dry Goods Co. v. Reinman & Wolort, 102 Ark. 287, 143"
S. W. 1087 (1912); Emrick v. Marcueilli, note 23, supra.
-"Bohon v. Port Jervis Gaslight Co., 122 N. Y. 18, 25 N. E. 246;
(1890).
OLunsback v. Hallester, 132 N. Y. 602, 10 N. Y. St. K. 374, 30 N. E..
1152 (1892).. See Dunsbach v. Hollister, 2 N. Y. S. 94 (1888).
2Blackfort v. Heman Uonst. Co., 132 Mo. App. 157, 112 S. W. 287'
(1908).
2 Owen v. Phillips, 73 Ind. 284 (1881); Comm. v. Miller, 139 Pa. 771,
21 Atl. 138 (1891); Hulburt v. McKone, et al., 55 Conn. 31, 10 Atl. 164.
(1887).
313 N. Y. App. Div. 299, 43 N. Y. S. 1 (1897).
675,
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tinuing or recurring nuisance, however trivial, provided only it is suf-
ficient to sustain an action at law for damages, will support an in-
junction.
3 '
In conclusion, as to the liability of a defendant in an action for
damages for blasting, recovery may be had: (1) where dirt, stones and
other debris are thrown by the blast upon adjoining property, irre-
spective of the question of negligence; (2) where the work of blasting
is done in (a) a situation or location where it is necessarily danger-
ous to persons or property, the negligence arising in attempting to
blast at all; and (b) in all other cases where the work itself has been
megligently done.32
JOAN A. EVANS.
CONTRACTS-SUIT BY SUBCONTRACTOR ON CONTRACT
'EXECUTED BY CONTRACTOR WITH OWNER.
The Jackson Lumber Company had a contract with the Board of
.Education of Lexington to construct a high school building. The
'lumber company sublet the steel work to the Huntington Iron Works
Company and the Union Transfer Company transported certain ma-
terials for the Huntington Company. This action was brought by the
lumber company against the school board to recover the balance due
on the original contract. The defendant asked that other claimants
'be made parties to the action. The Transfer Company came in as
-one of such parties and claimed the fund on the ground that it was held
'by the school board In trust for their use. Held: For Transfer Com-
pany.'
Quoting provisions from the contract in question, "Unless other-
'wise stipulated, the contractor shall provide and pay for materials, etc.-
used in the execution of work.-The contractor to indemnify and save
harmless the Board from all suits-and should guarantee the prompt
payment of all persons furnishing material and labor to said con-
tractor.-Final payment of the retained sum will not be made until
'the contractor should deliver to the Board a release of all liens arising
out of the contract."
2
The court reasoned thus, "a contract may inure to the benefit of
a third party depending upon whether the third person is a party to
the consideration, or the contract was entered into for his benefit, or
11 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 2d Ed., Vol. 5, p. 4383; Whit-
field v. Rogers, 26 Mass. (4 Cush.) 84 (1853); Luxo v. Higgin, 69 Cal.
256, 10 Pac. 674 (1886); Corning & Winslow v. Troy Iroquois Factory,
40 N. Y. 191 (1869); Harper, Etc., Co. v. Mountain, Etc., Co., 208 Pa. St.
.540, 57 Atl. 1055 (1904).
32 Lowden v. City of Cincinnati, note 16, supra.
IJ. T. Jackson Lumber Company v. Union Transfer & Storage
Cjompany, 246 Ky. 653, 55 S. W. (2d) 670 (1933).
2 Note 1, supra, at p. 654.
